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Traditionally, silence has been related to citizen disengagement and disempowerment. 
Indeed, at first light, the growth of silence is linked to deficits in democracy since silence 
is understood as passivity while action and speech are the dominant, and sometimes 
exclusive, modes of political praxis. 
But silence can mean different things to politics. It can assume a coercive dimension when 
it is imposed over marginalized groups (the powerless); nevertheless, it can also assume 
a form of resistance and empowerment when it condenses self-assertion and becomes a 
form to navigate relations of power. 
In this paper, we contribute to a politics of silence by examining how silence can be a 
factor of empowerment and liberty. Focusing on the notion of “communicative silences”, 
we posit that silence is not a dysfunction of political communication but a significant 
element of democracy. Far from being a pathology, silence can also be another mode of 
communication, one that it is separate from speech. 
 
 







We live in societies that do not tolerate well silences. We could almost say that we live 
in noisy societies where mutism is a threatened phenomenon. It has been suggested that 
the development of sound amplification is the most anti-social invention of modernity 
(Sim, 2007: 4). In effect, how can one express himself when he must hear all the time? 
Amplified sound and noise pollution can saturate the environment to the point the 
individual cannot escape it and cannot be heard. Modern media exorcise silence trying to 
avoid it fiercely: internet never stops streaming as television never ceases to broadcast. 
As media discourses become omnipresent and uninterrupted, silence becomes harder to 
achieve and to guarantee. Our culture is committed to the expansion of communication 
and, consequently to the contraction of silent moments.  
Yet, silence has played a crucial role in human culture: they are critical in religion 
(ascetism), science (reflection) or the arts (silence as an artistic tool). The ability to be, to 
think and analyze and to create are dependent of a forbearance from speech or noise.  
Silence has been seen as an absence, as a lack or deficient of communication. Those who 
mention silence envisage silence as a threat to community, something akin to a failure or 
malfunction. “Silence is that which is imposed upon marginalized groups, for example, 
so it is easily assumed that silence must be overcome. Silence is indicative of 
miscommunication, so a model of community based on an image of language as 
transparent communication must eliminate silence” (Ferguson, 2004: 2). Silence is linked 
to the horror of lack of communication, of aporia, it has to do with the renouncement of 
the ties that unite fellow citizens. 
To post-structuralism, silence can be fearful because it entails ideology as well as 
hierarchical and discursive orders (Foucault, 1971). The binary dichotomy speech/silence 
is a powerful tool to negotiate relationships as discourses produce their own silences. 
“There is not one but many silences and they are an integral part of the strategies that 
underlie and permeate discourses” (Foucault, 1990: 27). The famous adage: “Whereof 
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” with which Wittgenstein concludes his 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can perhaps express this dialectic speech/silence. It is as 
an impotency of speaking but, mostly, as the recognition that there are limits to speech. 
Beyond those limits, it is the silence the stretches its domain. However, silence is not 
inevitably a form of violence. It can contain also a space of dialogue and encountering. It 
can also be a meeting space of possible hospitality to one another (Derrida, 2000). Derrida 
claims that silence is not a lack but the very origin and source of all speaking. It is silence 
that “bears and haunts language, outside and against which alone language can emerge” 
(Derrida, 1978: 54).  
So, silence is not just miscommunication, it is not contrary to communication but may 
also be a form of communication. After all, there are meaningful silences (Glenn, 2004: 
16). Silence is not the absence of meaning: there are silences that eloquently speak 
(Beville&McQuaid, 2012). Silence can, for instance, become a statement, a refusal to 
accept, a defiant attitude.  It has some communicative functions that can be positive or 
negative: it can bond a group of people or divide them; it can hurt but it can also heal; it 
can reveal or conceal something (Jensen apud Sim, 2007: 14). 
In this paper, we contribute to a politics of silence by examining how silence can be a 
factor of empowerment and liberty. Far from being just an absence of something, silence 
is at the very core of communication. We posit that silence may not be just a dysfunction 
of political communication but an important element of democracy. Far from being a 




We start by looking into the relations between silence and politics while underscoring 
three ways to conceive that relation (oppression, resistance and empowerment). Next, we 
discuss the vocal ideal of democracy (Gray, 2015: 476) and the hypothesis of silence in 
citizenship. We conclude with a brief presentation of the notion of “communicative 
silence” and its main advantages to cope with three political challenges (abstention, 
political representation and deliberation). 
 
Silence and Politics  
 
There are three main perspectives on how to envisage silence as a political act: silence as 




One of the most pervasive associations between silence and politics consists in looking 
into silence as a tool of sociopolitical oppression and control (Jaworski, 1993). By 
silencing opposition or neglecting the free expression of political groups, the State can 
exert control over dominated groups.  
Clair (1998: 21) emphasizes how dominant groups impose silence to marginalized ones 
in a variety of ways: through coercion, hegemony, discursive practices, systematic 
structuring of institutions or informal impositions on conversations. The author is, thus, 
stressing, how silence is related to a power differential that is latent in every social 
interaction: those who speak and those who remain silent, those that makes other listeners 
and those who can just to listen. Whether consciously or unconsciously we inhabit silent 
spaces that could mean a variation on the distribution of political power.   
Political enforced silence is observed in various parts of the world and in different periods 
in history. Censorship is a traditional mode to superimpose silence on sensible topics and 
it is apanage in authoritarian regimes and dictatorships. It can be addressed to individual 
but also to social groups or journalistic institutions. Most totalitarian regimes refuse to 
allow opposition any political voice in the political agenda and sometimes even label 
them as rebels and insurgents in order to legitimize repression. “The myth is fostered in 
such instances that no opposition actually exists, which is very much to the advantage of 
the ruling elite in maintaining its hold over the populace” (Sim, 2007: 159). We can also 
testify this “art of silencing opponents” not just in Islamic fundamentalism but also in 
western democratic countries. For example, in Silencing Dissent: How the Australian 
Government is Controlling Public Opinion and Stifling Debate, Hamilton and Maddison 
argue that the Howard Government in Australia, over ten years, "systematically 
dismantled democratic processes, stymied open and diverse debate and avoided making 
itself accountable to parliament or the community" (Hamilton & Maddison, 2007: 4). 
Southard (2007) contends that the National Woman’s Party members-  the “Silent 
Sentinels” - drew strength from restricting ideological forces to constitute a militant 
identity while they fought for providing political voice to women. Paradoxically, these 
suffragists battled political silence and fought for women suffrage while essaying to gain 
political voice through silent protests. Silence was here a symbol to the lack of political 
rights and it conveyed beautifully the message that there was a social group being silenced 
and deprived of the possibility to influence and vote on political matters. Another example 
comes, for instance, from 1917 and the Negro Silent Protest Parade where their silence 
was a means to silently resist the equilibrium of power between white and negro people. 
Media are another key factor on the equation of silence and politics. Silencing the media 
is another ploy that governments resort to. China is known for having censors in Internet 
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and to restrict or prohibit the broadcast of certain contents. Israel keeps a tight control 
over news coverage from the Occupied Territories and most often the military impose 
media blackouts (Sim, 2007: 162). Norris and Inglehart, for instance, point to the impact 
of restrictive media environments on regime support and how dissention is erased or 
obliterated by suppressing or limit public voicing (Norris &Inglehart, 2008). 
So, silence can function as a means of severing political autonomy and the revindication 
of alternative points-of view. We are describing silence as being enforced or imposed. It 
was a kind of compulsory silence that oppresses minority groups and bounds the political 
powerless. Thus, silence can also be observed in the voicing of public opinion. Noelle-
Neumann’s (1993) spiral of silence – being the inability to publicly express, by the 
individual, his own political preferences in face of contrary public opinion - can be 
comprehended within this perspective that frames silence as an imposed (or self-imposed) 





When trying to understand the relation between silence and power, one should not only 
talk about the silence of the powerless (silencing subordinated groups) but also about the 
silence against the powerful (silencing as a deliberate act of fighting power).  
In contrast to the perspective of silence as something that restricts and impairs political 
participation, we will now consider that silence can, too, be a tool of political resistance. 
These two silences acts get together to maintain hegemonic configurations of power 
(Jungkunz, 2012: 129). In fact, silence can be negotiated, not just superimposed. 
Suppression and refusal along with engagements and resistance work upon these relations 
of power. Just remember the political engagement of silent vigils, just like that ones 
occurred in 1971 in North-America as a protest to Vietnam war. There are plenty of 
pictures, in Internet, portraying young women with posters “Until American stop killing 
and being killed in Vietnam”. 
It is true that silence is traditionally conceived as a ceasing of participation or a 
withdrawal (from a conversation, political or business life). By cutting off external stimuli 
and inputs, silence offers a space of retreat that ultimately states a form of disavowal. 
Linked to this withdrawal perspective of silence, there is a more overt refusal to 
participate. This refusal can assume a form of resistance and confrontation: in fact, by 
silencing one may not me giving up but, on the contrary, silence may be an active and 
confrontational attitude. Silence can, then, prove to be powerful, not only as a proactive 
isolation but also as a social function of resistance. 
One easy and familiar example would be the individual whose silence serves to resist the 
authority of policemen whose power cannot force an answer. By refusing to speak, the 
individual is using a constitutional right but is, at the same time, resisting to participate 
in the legitimated use of violence that police and military forces assume. “Silence can 
serve as resistance to any institution that requires verbal participation (as do virtually all). 
On a macroscopic political scale, states often require such participation and subsequently 
employ a variety of means to compel it. The state-sponsored requirement to take an oath 
is a particularly overt form of obligatory speech” (Ferguson, 2004: 8). 
Silence can become a form of resistance because silence is part of communication. By 
not engaging on conventional, ordered, regulatory or unitary discourses, silence can be 
an important way to disable disciplinaries discourses (Foucault, 1971). By doing so, 
silence transforms itself in a defensive function allowing for practices of freedom that 
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would be otherwise unattainable. As Jungkunz (2012: 134) synthetizes: “silence becomes 
a way to negotiate around and between and even is spite of a given regulatory structure”.  
In effect, many practices of everyday resistance and elusion to surveillance involve 
silence. Silences that resist are attempts to protest but they do not involve litigations nor 
are straightforward, vocal ways to make claims. Instead, silences that resist are practiced 
as forms of subversion: subverting the man, the government, the economy, the system 
(Jungkunz, 2012: 141). Silence as resistance involves a political intervention that is not 
conventional and, mainly, that subverts the configuration of discourses and narratives. 
The resisting silence displays the intention not to tell, not to consent, not to confess, not 
to answer. This kind of silence is insubordinate and, most often, it is based on practices 
of deliberate exclusion and silencing (refusing policies, injustices and decisions). In one 
word, resisting silences are insubordinate in two senses: they highlight defiant and 
disobedient attitudes that aim to negotiate; and refuse or work around the control of social 
and political expression. 
Silences that refuse and resist are, thus, not attempting to enlarge one’s presence in the 
world: instead, these silences are about turning away a political world, a social life, an 
identity or a community. They silently propose the individual’s own absence. By 
deploying silent attitudes, individuals maneuver between engagement and disengagement 
allowing alternative ways to do (and to be in) politics.  
In sum, silences that resist are a way to deal with power by gaining (another kind of) 
power: they do so my refusing to line up to what was supposed to say and to build a silent  




Silence can, likewise, be a form of power: it resists things said negotiation the contours 
of political life. Silence can, indeed, be a way of unsaying, a refusal to speech and 
classification. From this perspective, silence is not just related with the powerless but with 
the powerful: there are silences that empower, silences that are about gaining access to 
the political, social, economic, etc. “Silences that empower manipulate norms 
surrounding silence, speech, absence, and presence in order to bring attention to the 
detrimental consequence of silencing” (Jungkunz, 2012: 136). Those who use silences to 
empower are focused on the possibility of exclusion. In social and political contexts 
where speech is fundamental, silence calls attention to the relationships of inequality and 
to the break-downs. It can emphasize the inadequacies, differences, dissimilarities. In this 
case, silence is drawing attention to the dysfunctional relationships between subjects.  
Silence as empowerment and as a form of navigating  and negotiating power relations 
supposes an active, selective and protective practice. It relieves the individual from the 
compulsion to answer, to talk, and to self-disclosure.  
It is revealing that this same protective dimension of silence is also alluded in the 
Discourse of Inequality of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1992). In the Second Discourse, 
Rousseau describes nature's silence in the civilized state. According to him, silence does 
not entail apathy or an unreflective man. It is, on the contrary, a shield to the over-
exposure of the self. Silence is the very state of nature: a nature without speech, therefore 
without its intrinsic oppressions.  
Silence can mean different things to politics.  
As we have pointed out, it can assume a coercive dimension when it is imposed over 
marginalized groups, but it can also assume a form of resistance and empowerment when 
it condenses self-assertion and a form to negotiate relations of power. 
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So, we are starting to see that silences can be an important aspect of political life. But in 
order to examine the potentialities of silences to political communication, we should, first, 
consider the ways democratic theory has dealt with it.  
The next section discusses how silence has been depreciatively measured by democratic 




Silence and Democracy –the vocal ideal and silent citizenship  
 
Silence can be ostensibly anti-democratic.  
We say those who remain silent are consenting something (portuguese adage that can be 
translated in English as “silence gives consent”) (Cardoso e Cunha, 2005). This idea is 
already present in Plato’s Cratylus when he links silence into consent. “And since we 
grant this, Cratylus—for I take it that your silence gives consent (…) (435 b). Silence is 
treated as a way to cope or accept power. Defying the political tirant means to stop being 
silence and denounce his tyranny. Martin Luther King also says something similar. In a 
sermon in Selma, Alabama, on 8 March 1965, the day after “Bloody Sunday,” on which 
civil rights protesters were attacked and beaten by police on the Edmund Pettus Bridge, 
he said: “A man dies when he refuses to stand up for that which is right. A man dies when 
he refuses to stand up for justice. A man dies when he refuses to take a stand for that 
which is true.”. This line was popularized on social media as the following quote: “Our 
lives begin to end the day we become silent about things that matter”. Once more, we see 
this approach that equals silence into consent. 
The hypothesis that silence can be a threat to democracy come from the fact citizens are 
less likely to vote (Franklin, 2004) but more important, from the fact they are less capable 
of influencing the agenda of politicians and policymakers (Bartels, 2008). Coleman 
(2013) and Urbinati (2014) both draw attention to the growing deficits of voice in political 
decision-making. Citizens seldom manage to have their voices heard by governments. 
Developing this, Gray (2015: 474), for example, posits that contemporary democratic 
citizenship is becoming a silent citizenship.  
Traditionally, silence has, at least in part, been related to citizen disengagement and 
disempowerment. At first light, the growth of silence is linked to deficits in democracy. 
“Silence is primarily interpreted to be a private withdrawal from politics that contrasts 
with voice (…)- a normative vacuum in which citizens are excluded from democratic 
political decision-making through lack of resources, opportunities, information or 
articulateness” (Gray, 2015: 475). Democratic theory usually characterizes silent citizens 
as those who are apathic, inattentive or negligent on public affairs. Silence has been, thus, 
associated with indifference and detachment from public debate or deliberation, and it is 
not unfrequently related to an inability or willingness to take action (electoral abstention). 
Silence is understood as passivity (the realm of the powerless) while action and speech 
are the dominant, and sometimes exclusive, modes of political praxis. To be more exact, 
traditional democratic theory identifies silence with lack of speech. And since the creation 
and maintenance of community depends on communication, silence is viewed as being 
incompatible with community and society in general. Underlying this perspective, here is 
“a model which conflates community, communication and speech. Silence, whether that 
of a subaltern group or as perpetuated by institutional mechanisms, represents a threat to 
that nexus, and by extension a threat to politics” (Ferguson, 2004: 5). 
Habermas’ theory of the bourgeois public sphere is a great example of a social theory 
envisaging silence as a shortcoming of political communication and, more, as a threat to 
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politics. Politics would only be attainable on public domain by the exercise of collective 
reasoning and critical voicing that could influence political affairs. The public sphere was 
a place where private individuals articulate, voice and critically discuss public matters. It 
served as a counterweight to political authority as individuals gathered in face-to-face 
meetings (coffee houses, theaters, public squares, etc) as well as through media such as 
letters and books. To Habermas, the vibrant and influent activity of the public sphere was 
linked, not to silence, but with the strict and rigorous individual voicing and participation 
(Habermas, 1991). 
Moreover, Habermas’ later approach to contend social power and equality in 
contemporary times, took him to suggest a Universal Pragmatics and an “ideal speech 
situation”. In fact, similarly to his theory of the public sphere, Habermas finds in the 
verbal encounter between individuals the solution to modern dilemmas. In Theory of 
Communicative Action (1984; 1987), and Between Facts and Norms (1996) he resorts to 
discourse theory and speech act theory to anchor core concepts like “communicative 
reason” or “communicative action”. Habermas is, then, reducing freedom and justice to 
the availability of speech (Ferguson, 2004: 6). His normative theory of communicative 
action is crucially based on a view on democracy that depends fundamentally on speech, 
language and communication. Underlying Habermas’ social and political thought, there 
is this assumption equating silence to a menace. His approach grounds community, 
understanding and justice into a normative view on language. Silence is positioned at the 
side of inequality and oppression. If, to him, based on Universal Pragmatics and 
Communicative Action, community is all about language and speech, it is no surprise that 
silence is a prelude to indifference, lack, and social fragmentation. 
Democratic theory had always the tendency to put words and speech as the only possible 
mode to communication. This view that puts silence as a political menace is deeply 
ingrained, popular and widespread. Voice is the metaphor to public argument realizing 
the deepest aspirations of democratic citizenship. The vocal ideal of democratic 
citizenship (Gray, 2015: 476) entails a conception where having a voice and standing for 
it is the most elevated means of empowering those affected by political decisions. Dahl 
is very clear on this when he comments: “Silent citizens may be perfect subjects for an 
authoritarian ruler; they would be a disaster for democracy” (Dahl, 1998: 97).  
This attests how heavily democracy depends on political communication outside formal, 
governmental structures. But, most distinctively, it attests how political communication 
is averse to silences. Indeed, silence is being interpreted as an absence or failure of voice 
in politics, devoid of intent, content or meaning. According to this widespread 
perspective, “silent citizens are politically undemanding: those who are silent either prefer 
that democratic politics operate in the background of their lives, or are incapable of 
meaningfully contributing to collective decision-making processes. Silent citizens are 
also politically unorganized: mostly because those who are silent disproportionately lack 
access to politically relevant resources for voice, including time, money and education 
and civic skills” (Gray, 2015: 477-478). Because of these attributes, silent citizenship is 
thought as having negative effects on public opinion decreasing the diversity of voices 
being heard (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). In the same way, silence tends to tilt representation 
towards particular interests (the already wealthy and powerful) in detriment of those with 
less influence who tend to follow particular voices and, consequently, adopt conservative 
positions. 
This dysphoric description is certainly well justified in some cases. But, at the same time, 
this vocal ideal of democratic citizenship (Gray, 2015: 476) can sometimes be 
overgeneralized within contemporary political theory.  
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Because the assumption the links democracy and political communication to voice and 
public speaking is such speech-centric, the domain of silent citizenship has remained a 
field underexplored. Given that communication is immediately associated with speech, 
and that democratic citizenship has a vocal scope, studies on political communication 
tended to forget silence and its conceptualization. We agree with Gray when he advocates 
that “the vocal ideal fails to provide the tools we need to account for other motivations 
citizens might have for remaining silent, besides disengagement and disempowerment” 
(Gray, 2015: 483).  
If we are to ponder on the significance of silence in political communication, we should 
broaden the specter of possible meanings and distinguish potential dimensions of silence 
beyond lack, absence, failure or apathy. A comprehensive and relevant way to look to 
“the silence debate” in political communication would not exclusively consider 
democracy from be speech-centric point of view. Instead, it would consider extrinsic 
forms of silencing (distortions, ruptures, disbelief, disregard) but also intrinsic forms of 
silencing (that ways silencing is an act of communication and a central element of 
political discourses and negotiations of power). In other words, we are interested in 
highlighting positive, constructive and euphoric aspects of silence in political 
communication by focusing, not on the powerlessness side but on the empowerment side. 
By separating extrinsic and intrinsic forms of silence, we are differentiating between 
silence as imposition and silence as a choice; between silence that disempowers and 
silence that empowers. While stressing intrinsic forms of silence, we open space to reflect 
the communicative dimension contained in it. In effect, we should include in our exam 
how citizens communicate preferences and judgments in decision-making processes and 
acknowledge that the choice of silence, in itself conveys little information about the 
preferences and political attitudes of individuals. The vocal ideal of democracy has, first 
of all, interpreted that silence as expressing a negative political attitude. However, that 
perspective does not necessarily register silence as a communicative act. It comprehends 
silence as denial or negligence without posing the possibility that silence, instead of 
evidencing lack of motivation, could, in fact, configure a certain kind of political 
motivation. 
Beyond this vocal, speech-centric, rhetorical idea of democracy and political 
communication, we encounter a crucial difference: the silence that is suffered due to lack 
of opportunities and capacities is qualitatively quite dissimilar from the silence that, 
despite the existence of healthy and numerous opportunities, opt, decide and choose to 
abstain from voice. This is a silence of a radically new type: a communicative silence. 
Treating silence as a communicative function of political communication opens new 
possibilities for political theory to identify occurrences in which silence is not a symptom 
of deficit but, possibly, a symptom of enrichment and transformations of citizens’ 
political participation.  
Not all the silence is necessarily coercion or lack. A model of communicative silence can 
indeed anticipate special situations where the refusal to speak manifests a communicative 
power to state certain political positions in developed, complex, 21th century 
democracies. By contemplating a communicative model of silence in political 
communication, democratic theory can go beyond its speech-centric matrix and comprise 
an expansive understanding of political expression. Silences can, then becomes, another 
possibility to disclosure choices, affirm political commitments and reinforce political 
messages (such as distrust). 
So, in the next section, we account silence as a distinct mode of communication separate 
from speech. By rejecting institutionalized pratices of power, communicative silence is 
not a detached or aloof gesture but possibly an exquisite and unexpected form of claiming 
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a (outsider) role on political processes. Some types of silence, can, in this way, play a 





In this section we suggest a renewed position on silent citizenship endorsing silence as a 
communicative event. Because traditional democratic theory identifies silences with 
absent voices or failed communication, it misses the motivations for political mutism or 
verbal discretion. They tend, so, to mix active and politically engaged attitudes with those 
that are not.  
Some degrees of silent citizenship have been already discerned and they vary according 
to their level of engagement. Gray (2015: 475) differentiates between awareness, 
ambivalence, aversion and disaffection.  
We will not dwell in the mapping of this attitudes behind silent citizenship. In alternative, 
we prefer to reflect on the general properties and advantages of considering silence as a 
positive outcome on political communication. Once silence is recognized as having a 
communicative intent - like speech - we can surpass those conceptions that see silence as 
an effect of inequality and asymmetric distributions of power. In contrast to this view, the 
hypothesis of communicative silence supposes that silence is a form of practicing power. 
As such, silent does not directly mean exclusion or even seclusion. Perhaps, it is because 
silence can empower that we witness vulnerable citizens (such as gender or ethnic 
minorities) doing such an intensive and exhaustive use of silence (ex: the “Silent 
Sentinels”). It is at the moment they are vulnerable that citizens are empowered to use 
silence as a positive stance to wordlessly make their points they may start to feel they do 
have an impact (however small it may be) on public decisions and collective debates. It 
is true that they may not deliberate in the conventional sense; yet, silence does not 
unavoidably mean that they are not interested to discreetly make a point. Speaking is 
crucial in political communication but the growing prominence of silence and its 
variations (vigils, voting abstention, refuse to participate in political polls, silent protests, 
pacific occupation of public space, parades, marches, etc) should make us turn our heads 
into the realms of nonverbal communication. 
We call “Communicative Silences” to those wordless political behaviors that express 
something with a clear objective and intentionality even if without verbal messages. They 
encompass the political attitudes that betray a given position but that are expressed by 
silent or wordless forms of communication. Without entering the Palo Alto school 
(Watzlawick et ali., 1967) discussion about the intentionality of communication and its 
concomitant adage “One cannot not to communicate”, we put communicative silences as 
dependent of intentionality.Therefore, a silence has a communicative charge when he is 
intentionality used to convey certain meanings or when that silence is perceived to contain 
or evoke, implicitly or explicitly, an intention with communicative meaningful 
implications. For instance, Johannesen (1974) argues that in meaningful silences we have 
to assume that some thought processes are involved. And Jaworski (1993) signals that 
silence occurs and is perceived as significant and meaningful when talk is expected and 
is intentionally withheld. This possibility of meaningful silences is just now being 
extended to the domains of political communication, but it is well known for many years 
in interpersonal communication. Wong (2003), for example, has concluded that, despite 
cultural differences, different groups of people demonstrate experience of using silence 




Silence becomes communication when it is intentionally manifested. Communicative 
silences include intentions or goals and involve a manifestation of purpose. 
Communicative silences are, then, reflective activities; but, instead of being symbolically 
express through language and speech, they produce a non-verbal discourse on political 
issues. There is still a “voice”, but this is a paradoxical voice: one that cannot he hear and, 
yet, it screams a political position.  
We are, then, dealing with a metaphorical sense of “voice” when we say that 
communicative silences produce an unhear, wordless, mute voice. These kinds of silences 
lie beneath nonlinguistic elements and are, mostly, inferred. We are taking into political 
communication the intentional uses of silences to convey meaningful messages that 
people naturally use. What is interesting in silence is that it is socially constructed (St. 
Clair, 2003: 87). In every culture is exists with communicative implications. Although it 
may be an accepted behavior (as in Japan) or a behavior to avoid (most western societies), 
silences possess an extensive pattern of social and cultural use. Wainberg (2017) 
distinguishes between 15 types of silence including “political silence”, “rhetorical 
silence” and “sacred silence”. 
By acknowledging this variety, we are in conditions to accept communicative silence as 
a way that citizens have potentially at their disposal to transmit meaningful, even if subtle, 
political messages. It should be noted that by “political communication” we understand a 
broad field concerned with the spreading of information and its influences on politics, 
policy makers, the news media and citizens. It encompasses, among many other things, 
political campaigns, media debates, social media posts or formal speeches. Bringing 
silence into political communication studies underscores how silence can be an 
affirmative, planned and deliberated attitude to citizenship and democracy. We are not 
here dealing with silence in the sense as a rhetorical political strategy (Anderson, 2003). 
Nor are we referring exclusively to those particular silences who violates expectations 
that are held by the public as in cases of media blackouts, refusals to be give a public 
speech or denials to answer journalist’s questions. This type of silence is situated on a 
micro-level of political communication (ex: the president refusing to speak on a pressing 
issue) (Brummet, 1980).  
Instead, in this paper, we situate silence at the macro-level of political communication: 
silence not as a singular, individual, specific act but silence as some collective endeavors 
whose effects are projected as part of the decision-making process. So, we look to silences 
not so much as rhetorical maneuvers, used by politicians, to give emphasis, authority or 
denying importance and legitimacy; nor we focus on media coverage of silences affecting 
the public’s perception of a political issue. Communicative silences include, in contrast, 
all the inferred meanings given by the different political actors to silence as an intentional 
and active expression of behavior. 
Political communication may take multiple forms in today’s democracies: by accenting 
silences as communicative constructs we give it a wider understanding. By on hand, we 
have direct vocal, rhetorical, linguistic expressions of political choice and decision-
making (such as deliberations, campaigns, petitions, votes, political crowds, speeches and 
commentaries).  
By other hand, by taking into account silence, we have now at our disposal nonlinguistic 
forms of communication. In this sense, communicative silences are indirect expressions 
of political choice that must be interpreted and inferred. So, silence is a kind of 
supplement to voice: not an unavoidable replacement but a possible alternative to the 
clarification of political positions. Seen as empowerment, communicative silences stress, 
not exclusion (marginalized groups to whom silence is compulsory) but inclusion. 
Inclusion because those social groups found alternative ways to make themselves 
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wordlessly “heard”. Inclusion because the symbolic resources so be silent are 
incomparably more accessible and abundant that those required to publicly speak. In 
communicative silences, we have political actors who freely choose to become 
(temporarily or permanently) silent in order to prove a point that does not require 
linguistic resources, opportunity or identity means. There is no vocabulary to attend, nor 
intellectual abilities to critically examine reasons. 
By not speaking, citizens are still acting because that particular silence becomes a 
communicative form to express a perspective over an issue. Of course, we must 
condescend: what is expressed through silence has not the richness, meaning or 
complexity of verbal signs that are propositional. Still, silence exists in a given social and 
political context that, along with pragmatics, can orient the interpretations and inferences 
that silence expresses including beliefs, expectations and projections. Most of the political 
communication studies dealt with political actors who voiced, spoke and critically 
reasoned. By incorporating communicative silences, political communication can now 
deal with silent actors that despite their subtlety could still be engaged in some form of 
politics. The major difference to other studies is that communicative silences are 
understood, not to entail a passive or negligent attitude towards politics but an active, 
although indirect and subtle, attitude to political issues. 
Communicative silences could be dynamic, deliberate choices whose importance to 
political communication lies precisely in the fact that they may reveal (at some degree) 
citizens’ dispositions, judgements and leanings. So, according to these assumptions, 
political communication can and should pay attention to the role of silences, and how 
they are used by citizens and political actors to politically communicate. These silences 
we call “communicative” are behaviors that ostensibly express a range of possible 
political meanings. So, it is not just voice that empowers political actors (as in traditional 
theories of democracy). Maybe silence has political significance beyond neglect and 
apathy. Silence can, in reality, be interpreted as an attempt to call attention to the necessity 
of mutual agreement on sensitive or complex issues. For instance, media blackout, also 
referred to as a silenzio stampa (literally press silence), refers to the specific situation a 
football club or national team refuse to give interviews or in any other way cooperate with 
the press, often during important tournaments often due discontentment. They may feel 
that the media does not depict the club and their activities in an objective way and their 
vote to silence is a conspicuously form to express that very dissatisfaction. 
  
Implications of Communicative Silences to Abstention, Political Representation and 
Deliberation  
 
To conclude these necessarily brief comments on communicative silence, we want to refer 
to three theoretical implications. These assumptions are logic consequences that follow 
the theoretical framework we have put forth. They lack empirical confirmation. Still, they 
may take us to review our own perspective on silence citizenship and political silences. 
First of all, by conceiving positively silence (as empowerment) we may have a renew 
point of view into a dominant phenomenon on elections: abstention.  
We generally conceive abstention and silence as being related. Silence is here a symptom 
of unresponsiveness and lack of interest. But, what if, we put communicative silences in 
equation? If silences can be forms of expression, abstention must be considered at a new 
light. They would not be just effects of negligence or lack of interest but could also be 
treated as an alternative form to discipline political representatives. Abstention would, 
then, be a form of communicative silence where citizens passively answer to political 
agendas. Abstention could, thus, be an ostensive attitude of disfavor. It would mean 
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discordance and disappointment. By looking into abstention (and its silent configuration) 
from a communicative standpoint, abstention would contain a range of possible meanings 
that contemporary politics could use to better get into citizens.  
In this way, silence generates a great deal of information and enlightenment to the 
political process. Communicative silences assume a point of reference from which 
political actors can infer evaluative assessments that may direct, orient or influence their 
decisions.  
Not all silences are communicative. But that does not mean that all political silences 
reveal oppression or lack of interest. To political communication and democracy theory 
research, the true question is not to pass over silences as minor faults of citizenship and 
politics. It is to take those same questions to a level where silences could be understood 
by what they are and not what the vocal ideal of democracy reasons they are. 
Second, and following up the abstention topic, communicative silences raise new doubts 
about political representation.  
Because voting assumes such a central place in the communication between politicians 
and citizens, when these fail to show on the polls and do not use their right to vote, we 
immediately tend to think of inattention, inaction or apathy. But if  - at least some - 
silences empower citizens, the act of not voting could be viewed as a political attitude. 
Of course, it is difficult to discern what is the meaning of that: disagreement with political 
program; lack of identification with the candidate; democracy distrust?  
However difficult to apprehend that should not deter us to identify silences with certain 
kinds of motivations associated with political representation. It may point to a myriad of 
different things (maybe citizens think they should be more often heard…). Indeed, it could 
manifest a form of political expression that has nothing to do with voicing and speech 
but, still, it indicates a certain kind of preoccupations (and contestations).  
Third, communicative silences can also have important implications in consensus and 
deliberation.  
Silences are key indicators of possible opposition or assent. Could not silent disagreement 
be a form of deliberation, in the sense of reflection or cogitation? Deliberative democracy 
is based on discursive intercourse. But, what if silences could be also be a form of non-
verbal discursive practice? After all, silences can be eloquent. And to be eloquent we need 
a discourse. So, by contemplating the hypothesis of communicative silences, we could 
displace deliberation and consensus to other domains that are not exclusively verbal or 
linguistic.  
Once more, there are too many meaning nuances on silences. But that does not stop us to 
consider that some communicative silences function as alternative (minor or humble) 
forms of political deliberation. Silence may demonstrate genuine consensus (in a plenary 
voting, for example), but it can also evidence a conflict (ex: when political actors stop 
giving press conferences). In fact, when a consensus is reached and is putted into voting, 
political actors can vote their opposition and disagreement; or they can silently abstain to 
vote in a (not spoken) manifestation of dissent.  
There are plenty of motivations to silence.  
Our task here was not to exhaustively enumerate them nor proposing a typology. All we 
want was to consider silences as power mechanisms. We have briefly described 
communicative silences as positive and active expressions of political attitudes. The 
implication of silences as communication on abstention, political representation and 
deliberation were indicated and, hopefully, they can open new perspectives on the study 








Throughout this paper silence has been approached, not as a deficit, impairment or 
pathology of political communication but as an element we should pay attention since 
silence can also be a form of power in social relations. 
This does not mean either that silence, even if it can have a communicative injunction, is 
considered as a virtuosity. Communicative silences have potential to impact political 
communication at macro-level but silence is not necessary a good thing. What we wanted 
to discuss was the singular possibilities that transform silence, from a parasite of 
communication into a form of political communication. 
To remain silent does not necessarily point to subordination and (imposed) lack of speech. 
It is also a right that may impose severe limitations to political affairs, it also a way to 
influence and (paradoxically) intervene. The effect of silence empowerment in 
democracies has been already suggested (Gray, 2015: 487). We took this possibility and 
claimed that some silences are intentional, have a political message and, as such, present 
a communicative dimension.  
By talking in “communicative silences” in political communication we are not suggesting 
that speech-centric, vocal, rhetorical democratic theories are wrong. When we refer to 
“communicative silences” we do not, of course, criticize all the speech tradition of politics 
We acknowledge those works and even say speech is central and essential to political 
communication. Speech enable a full reflection on matters and enables citizens to get 
together and recognize their identities. To Arendt (1958), for example, action and speech 
disclose to the world individuals own identities. They can reveal themselves as “who” 
they are, instead of “what” they are. Through speech we commit with ourselves and with 
others, gain refreshed perspectives and articulate our needs. 
Instead, what we argued was that speech is not the exclusive mode of political 
communication. In contrast with democratic theories that put speech above other forms 
of non-verbal communication, we tried to show how silence deserves to be studied 
according to a positive role in political communication. It takes two individuals to enact 
a silence as silence affect human interaction. Silence may be, in some cases, just another 
way to navigate asymmetrical symbolic resources or unequal influence and knowledge. 
By emphasizing communicate silences, we open to silence multiple meanings.  
So, silence is not necessarily an obstacle to democracy nor a deficit of political 
communication. It is also not necessarily a virtue.  
To sum up, we have put silence as a potential communicative element that is relevant to 
democracy since it can influence political praxis. We are adopting an extended 
perspective on silence that separates its disempowering and empowering facets. Is seems 
silence can be used in positive ways and in alternative (not replacing it) to speech. There 
are claims that demand to be heard. But this public voice is predominantly produced in 
silent, without words or speech. It is other strategy: maybe a discursive strategy (cf. 
Foucault, 1990: 27) even if not a linguist, speech-centric discourse.  
One of the most important things political communication research could do is to look 
into these discursive pauses and mutisms and trace a theory on its implications to political 
processes. 
Possibly, it could be asked: why citizens turn into silent forms of political participation 
and why they have chosen those instead of more direct, traditional form of engagement? 
Why some citizens or political groups may think it is costlier and more dangerous to 
overtly speak? How silence strategies differ in its communicative intents? And is silent 
empirically effective or is it just a theoretical hypothesis? Do silence affect the perception 
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of citizens about political actors in comparison with those that prefer verbal 
revindications? 
There are many questions to ask that demand more hypothesis, observations and 
operationalizations. Only more studies could fully answer these questions. In this paper, 
we take a more modest goal and tried to ponder on the silent dimension of political 
communication. 
Silence is a complex subject. But, its prominence in 21th century politics pushes 
contemporary researches to evaluate its limits and functions. The biased view on speech 
and silence must not prevent us to study the political implication of silence (and in 
particular its communicative forms).  
As Jungkunz remembers: “By illuminating the promise of silences as participatory 
resources in our efforts to struggle for democracy as a way of life, we bring within our 
disciplinary field of vision practices and subjects who have too often been placed at the 
margins of political science. Silences that empower, protest, resist, and refuse offer 
citizens, consumers, workers, friends, lovers, and thinkers ways to negotiate power 
dynamics beyond a one-dimensional emphasis upon speech” (Jungkunz, 2012: 149). 
Silences can be drastically insistent as they become insubordinate, interpellators, or 
affirmative. It is this very complexity that cannot be exempted of a careful analysis as a 
tool to fight for democratic change.  We must take into account silences and their 
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